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Abstract
We consider the determinants of the evolution of wage in-
equality in the context of the literature on entry and exit
of establishments. Using several measures of wage inequal-
ity (overall, within-group, and between-groups), we conclude
that shutdowns reduce overall and within-group inequality
because they eliminate low-pay jobs. Startups increase wage-
inequality between age and, especially, education groups, be-
cause newly-created establishments make staffing choices that
are different from those made by continuously-operating es-
tablishments and establishments that shut down.
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1 Introduction
Evidence on the evolution of earnings in the industrialized world un-
equivocally indicates a rise in inequality since the 1980s that has been
much more pronounced in the United States and the United Kingdom
than in Continental Europe. Although market forces and institutional
factors are jointly responsible for changing earnings inequality every-
where, the more limited rise in inequality in Europe has been widely
attributed to the fact that wage changes are bindingly constrained by
the wage setting institutions in place there (Blau and Kahn, 1996).
However, comparing trends in inequality in eight OECD countries,
Gottschalk and Joyce (1998) concluded that much of the variation ob-
served can be explained by market forces. They found that large off-
setting supply and demand shifts are sufficient to explain the smaller
increase in earnings inequality even in countries where institutions are
usually thought of as binding.1
The focus on market forces revealed the role played not only by
changes in relative factor supplies, but also by shifts in labor demand.
The importance of such demand factors as international trade (Bor-
jas and Ramey, 1994), skill-biased technological change (Berman et al.,
1994; Juhn, 1999), or the changing nature of firm-level wage-policies
(Cardoso, 1999) has been pointed out. Despite the difficulty of sin-
gling out one dominant reason for the observed shifts in labor demand
(Baldwin and Cain, 2000), there is general agreement that changes in
wage inequality reflect an increase in relative demand for skilled work-
ers (Autor et al., 2008). Moreover, Katz and Murphy (1992) show that
changes in the allocation of labor between industries and occupations
were the driving force behind changes in U.S. wage distribution between
1963 and 1987.
1The importance of demand and supply forces in shapping between-group wage inequality has
been earlier documented for Portugal by Centeno and Novo (2009).
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Furthermore, we know from a large literature on the turnover and
mobility of firms that similar firms in narrowly defined industries, even
when facing similar market conditions, make different (and persistent)
choices in terms of the (skill) composition of their workforce (Halti-
wanger et al., 1999).2 Whereas heterogeneity in productivity and earn-
ings of incumbent firms at any point in time may be accounted for
by vintage effects (Lambson, 1991), more heterogeneous outcomes for
new businesses could be the result of the complementary choices en-
trepreneurs make with regard to technology, organization, or manage-
rial ability as part of the experimentation process of creating and run-
ning a business (Haltiwanger et al., 2007). Allowing for the presence of
labor adjustment costs further explains why incumbent firms - because
they have more constraints to maintaining their worker-mix - may re-
spond more slowly (if at all) to changes in their business environment
and, for this reason, become a source of the observed persistence of
workforce composition and stability of the earnings distribution.3
This article focuses on the determinants of changes in the wage
distribution. We acknowledge the importance of demand factors and
frame the problem in the context of the literature on the turnover of
establishments. Although previously unexplored in this context, this
is an appropriate setting considering how important the reallocation
of labor across industries and occupations is known to be in terms
of the evolution of wages. Our aim is to identify the role that es-
tablishment turnover plays in explaining changes in wage differences
within and between groups of workers. Using a rich, longitudinally
matched employer-employee dataset, we explore cross-regional varia-
tions to identify the causal effects of the turnover of establishments on
earnings inequality. The focus on regional variations has the advantage
2For a survey of this literature and of its main results, see Caves (1998).
3In extreme cases, labor adjustment costs may bias firms’ response to exogenous shocks toward
the entry-exit margin, as is the case in Portugal (Vareja˜o, 2003).
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of guaranteeing a common institutional support, which allows us to
concentrate on the role of market forces alone. Moreover, because we
use data from a single source, full comparability of results across regions
is assured. The analysis spans a 22-year period, from 1986 to 2007, and
covers the universe of Portuguese establishments with wage-earners.4
The article is divided into five parts. Section 2 describes the dataset
that we use to measure earnings inequality and the corresponding changes.
Section 3 describes the evolution of wage inequality in Portugal over the
years analyzed. In Section 4 we present the empirical strategy and an-
alyze the relationship between changes in labor demand as manifested
by flows of entry and exit of establishments and wage inequality. The
final section concludes.
2 Data Description
The dataset of this study was constructed using the data from Quadros
de Pessoal (QP). QP is an annual mandatory employment survey col-
lected by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor that covers all establish-
ments with wage earners. Every year, all employers with wage earners
are legally obliged to fill in a standardized questionnaire.5 Currently,
the dataset contains yearly information on about 350,000 firms, 400,000
establishments and 3 million employees.
Data are available on each establishment (location, economic ac-
tivity, and employment), the firm with which it is affiliated (location,
economic activity, employment, sales, and legal framework) and each
and every one of its workers (gender, age, education, skill, occupation,
tenure, earnings, and duration of work). The information on earn-
ings is very detailed and complete. It includes the base wage (gross
pay for normal hours of work), regular benefits, irregular benefits, and
4Public Administration and non-market services are excluded.
5From 1986 to 1993 information is reported as of March, and as of October from 1994 on.
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overtime pay, as well as the underlying mechanism of wage bargaining.
Information on standard and overtime hours of work is also available.
The dataset is longitudinal in nature. Each firm/establishment en-
tering the database is assigned a unique identifying number and the
Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a unit that has pre-
viously reported to the database is not assigned a different identification
number.
In this study we use QP data for the 24-year period from 1985 to
2008. Notwithstanding, the analysis is restricted to the years 1986
to 2007, for reasons that are detailed below. During this period, the
Portuguese economy went through three complete business cycles.
Given the focus of this study, we construct a dataset at the level
of the region, which is our unit of observation. We consider the Por-
tuguese territory divided into 30 regions (28 on Portugal’s mainland
plus the isles of the Azores and Madeira), which correspond to the
NUTS classification at the 3-digit level.6
Our final dataset is obtained from two separate building blocks. The
first contains information on wage inequality and the characteristics of
the workforce at the level of the region. It is obtained from QP worker-
level files. Because these files do not exist for the years 1990 and 2001,
we have 22 yearly observations for each region. Present in this block are
four distinct measures of overall and within-group wage inequality: the
coefficient of variation of hourly wages (CV ), and the ratios between
the 90th and the 10th (P90/P10), the 90th and the 50th (P90/P50),
and the 50th and the 10th (P50/P10) percentiles of the hourly wage
distribution.7 All these measures of wage inequality are computed for
the entire employed population of each region (overall inequality within
6NUTS - Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics - classification is a hierarchical system
for dividing up the economic territory of the EU for the purpose of data collection and framing
regional policies. The 3-digit level is the lowest and corresponds to the smallest European regions.
7Hourly wages are defined as the ratio between the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal
hours of work) and the total number of hours worked in the corresponding month. In order to
avoid wage outliers, the top and bottom 1 percent observations were dropped from the data.
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the region) and within groups in each region (within-group regional
wage inequality). For this purpose, groups are defined according to
gender, age (under 25, 25 to 34, 35 to 54, and above 54 years of age),
and education (less than 9 years of schooling, 9 - the mandatory level
of schooling, 12 complete years of schooling, and college education).
Measures of regional wage inequality between groups are also part
of the first data block. They correspond to the estimates of the coef-
ficients of the corresponding group variables in a Mincerian-type wage
equation estimated separately for each year and each region. The de-
pendent variable in all these equations is the log of hourly wages. The
set of regressors includes controls for the workers’ age, gender, tenure
(and tenure squared), skill categories, and educational levels.8 Worker
attributes are assumed to be exogenous to the region. This would be a
problem if there were spatial selection in the unobservables, the most
likely candidate being ability. However, given our focus on the dynam-
ics of earnings inequality, the problem is relevant only if spatial biases
undergo important changes over the period (Duranton and Monastirio-
tis, 2002).9 All wage equations were estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS) using QP worker data.
The characteristics of the workforce also included in this first data
block are the gender, age, and education composition of those employed
in each region’s private sector.
The second building block of our final dataset contains information
for each region and year on job turnover and the shares of employment
creation and destruction accounted for by the entry and exit of estab-
lishments. All these variables were computed from QP establishment-
8For each of the workers’ characteristics, the same categories as described abovewere considered.
The categories omitted were: men (gender), under 25 years (age), less than mandatory schooling
(education). For skills, we considered five categories: top and mid-level executives, supervisors,
highly-skilled and skilled professionals, semi-skilled and unskilled professionals, and apprentices
(omitted).
9We believe the problem is not as serious as in other national cases, given the notoriously
low intensity of internal migration in Portugal (Tavares et al., 2010). Besides, controlling for
qualifications should control, at least partially, for ability.
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level files. For each spell of the data, we identify an establishment
entry whenever information for that establishment is reported to QP
for the first time in the corresponding spell, i.e., if the establishment is
not present in any of the preceeding waves of the data.10 Similarly, we
identify an establishment exit in one year whenever information for the
establishment is absent for that year and for all subsequent years, i.e.,
if the establishment is not present in any of the subsequent waves of the
data until 2008.11 After identifying establishment entries and exits in
every year, we computed the corresponding number of jobs created and
destroyed by new and exiting establishments (see Davis et al., 1996).Be-
cause we need at least one previous and two subsequent spells of the
data to identify entries and exits, respectively, we cannot compute the
rates of establishment turnover for 1985 and 2008. Furthermore, due to
changes in the identification number of the establishments introduced
in 1991 and to changes in the timing of data collection in 1994, we can-
not correctly or consistently compute establishment turnover in these
two years. For that reason, we dropped the corresponding information
from our final dataset. As result, the second block of data has 20 yearly
observations on the same 30 regions.
Merging these two data blocks, we obtain a panel on the 30 Por-
tuguese regions with 18 years of complete data, which we use in the
empirical work.
10For each year, we use all previous spells of the data to identify an entry. Entries in 1986
correspond to establishments reporting data for that year but not for 1985, whereas entries in
2008 correspond to establishments reporting data for that year but not for any of the previous
23 years. Due to the mandatory nature of Quadros de Pessoal, this procedure is not likely to
influence the results and it has the advantage over the alternative procedure - use of a fixed
number of previous spells to identify entries - of minimizing the loss of information.
11For each year, we use all subsequent spells of the data to identify an exit. Exits in 2007
correspond to establishments reporting data for 2006 but not for 2007 and 2008, whereas exits in
1986 correspond to establishments reporting data for 1985 but not for any of the subsequent 23
years. Again for the same reasons as for entries, and considering the alternatives available, this is
our preferred procedure.
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3 Trends in Wage Inequality
Figures 1 and 2 document the increase in wage inequality that occurred
in the Portuguese economy between 1986 and 2007. These figures show
that at the beginning of the period (between 1986 and 1994), there was
a sharp increase in wage inequality, which was partially offset in the 5-
year sub-period that followed, only to revive from the year 2000 on and
stabilize around the year 2005. From Figure 2, we can see that all the
changes in the wage distribution during this period occurred at its top,
wage inequality remaining stable at the lower-tail (see the evolution of
the ratios between percentiles 90 and 50, and 50 and 10 in Figure 2).
In order to understand how changes in overall wage inequality in
Portugal were generated, it is instructive to see whether they mirror
similar changes within and between groups of workers or whether, on
the contrary, they are the result of partially offsetting changes between
and within groups.
In Figures 3 to 8, we plot the evolution of the coefficient of variation
of hourly wages for each sub-group considered (within-group inequality)
and the estimates of the coefficients of the corresponding variables in the
(log) wage equations, estimated according to the procedure described
in the previous section (between-group inequality).
Wage inequality within gender groups is in line with the overall trend
- there is an increase in wage inequality for both men and women and
the timing of the variations we observe coincides with that of the over-
all economy (Figure 3). Still, wage inequality among female workers
rose faster and was, at the end of the period, greater than among male
workers. This increase in the variation of wages among women was
accompanied by a rise in the difference between men and women’s con-
ditional wages (Figure 4) - between 1988 and 1995, in absolute value,
the gender wage gap increased from 11.9 to 15.8 percent. Although
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this trend was interrupted in the years that followed, by 2007 women’s
wages were 13.6 percent less than those of men’s with similar observable
characteristics.
Until 1994, the coefficient of variation of wages also increased within
all age groups considered - Figure 5. However, from that year on the
most significant change is the marked decline in the differences of wages
earned by workers below the age of 25. Between age groups - Figure
6 - the most noticeable facts are the decline in the difference between
conditional wages of the two youngest worker cohorts (the estimated
coefficient of the 25 − 34 age group dummy dropped by around one-
half from 1986 to 2007) and the rise of the conditional wage differential
between workers aged 55 and over and the reference category (the es-
timated coefficient of the 55 and over age group dummy more than
doubled between 1986 and 2007).
Turning now to wage inequality within groups with different levels of
education (Figure 7), we see that all groups considered, except college
graduates, follow the overall trend: within-group inequality increases
until 1994 and declines or stabilizes thereafter. For college graduates,
there is a steady rise in within-group wage inequality after 1991. The
increase in wage inequality within the group of the most highly edu-
cated may be explained by a variety of factors, such as over-education,
ability-schooling interactions, school quality and diversity of fields of
specialization (Martins and Pereira, 2004). During this period, there
was also a decline in the school premium for workers at all levels of ed-
ucation, though especially so for those with a college degree, which was
noted earlier by Cardoso (2007) - Figure 8. The decline in the premium
for college education after 1993 is consistent with the rapid increase in
the supply of this type of labor since the mid-1990s (Centeno and Novo,
2009).
From the evidence reported, we may conclude that between 1986 and
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2007, the evolution of wage inequality in Portugal was driven by changes
in within-group wage differences that were common to all groups con-
sidered. This within-group evolution was reinforced, in the case of
college graduates, in the first years of this period, by a sharp increase
in the returns to college education.
4 Establishment Turnover and Wage Inequality
4.1 Empirical approach
Thus far, we have documented the evolution of wage inequality in Por-
tugal over a period of more than 20 years. Our analysis was carried
out at the national level. In this section, we shift attention to the role
that the turnover of establishments may have played in shaping the
observed evolution of wage inequality.
Over this period, establishment turnover accounts for 49 percent of
the total job turnover, which is on average equal to 30 percent per year.
Both establishment flows account for a large share of total job turnover
- the exit of establishments represents 44 percent of all jobs destroyed
and establishment start-ups account for 52 percent of all newly-created
jobs.12
To identify the effect of establishment turnover on wage inequality
we rely on variations across Portuguese regions and over time. We use
the panel dataset described in Section 2 to estimate, by fixed-effects
(FE), a regression equation of the form:
Ineqi,t = β0 + β1Startupi,t−1 + β2Shutdowni,t−1 + β3Xi,t−1 + vi,t (1)
12The importance of the intensive (expansion and contraction) and the extensive (entry and exit)
margins of employment adjustment as sources of job turnover varies considerably across countries.
Hamermesh’s (1993) reading of the existing literature implies that, on average, establishment
turnover accounts for one-third of total job turnover. Blanchard and Portugal (2001), using the
same data as we do but for a different period, found that in Portugal, annual job flows produced
by both establishment startups and establishment shutdowns account for almost half of total gross
employment flows.
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where, the error term is written as:
vi,t = ei,t + ui. (2)
Ineqi,t denotes one of several alternative measures of wage inequality
in region i and year t that will be used sequentially. Startupi,t−1 is the
proportion of all jobs created in region i at time t − 1 by expanding
units (including those newly-opened) that is accounted for by business
startups. Shutdowni,t−1 is the proportion of all jobs destroyed in region
i at time t− 1 by declining units (including those that closed) that is
accounted for by establishment shutdowns, and Xi,t−1 is a matrix of
other regressors, evaluated at time t− 1, that includes the proportion
of women, youth (under 25 years old), and workers with a college degree
in the workforce of the region, as well as the net annual employment
growth rate in the region. We include these regressors in order to
control for the characteristics of local labor supply and the state of
the regional economy.13 We also control for the state of the national
economy by adding a dummy variable to the regressor’s set that takes
on the value one if the observation refers to an expansionary year. The
error term vi,t includes a regional time-invariant component ui and a
region-specific time-variant component ei,t.
Because some independent variables are lagged by one year, the total
number of observations per region is reduced to 15, as we also cannot
use observations for the years 1986, 1992, and 1995.14
13We would have liked to control for local unemployment, but information on unemployment
rates at the level of the region does not exist. However, we used the information on job applications
and registered unemployment released by the Portuguese Employment Agency to compute a proxy
for the unemployment rate at the regional level. This was possible only for the years 1993 on.
Adding this variable to our estimating equations does not qualitatively modify the results of
interest, which are not reported.
14Table A in Appendix A reports the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables included
in the regression model.
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4.2 Results
Overall inequality
Equation 1 was first estimated taking the four overall inequality
measures (i.e. the coefficient of variation and the ratios between per-
centiles 90, 50, and 10) computed at the level of the region as dependent
variables. Results are reported in Table 1.
The startup of new establishments has no significant effect on overall
wage inequality, regardless of how the latter is measured.15 On the con-
trary, the shutdown of existing establishments has a sizeable negative
effect on inequality. If we consider wage inequality as measured by the
coefficient of variation of hourly wages (first data column in Table 1),
we see that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of jobs
destroyed due to shutdowns reduces the coefficient of variation by 17.4,
which is aproximately 0.3 percent of its mean value. The effect is of the
same magnitude when we consider wage inequality as measured by the
ratio between wages at percentiles 90 and 10 and 90 and 50, and smaller
at the bottom of the wage distribution - the ratio between percentiles
50 and 10 is reduced by approximately 0.07 percent of its mean value
for each additional percentage point increase in the proportion of jobs
destroyed due to establishment shutdowns.
TABLE 1: OVERALL WAGE INEQUALITY
Region FE estimates (N=450)
CV P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10
Startupt−1 -3.720 -0.270 -0.138 -0.050
(-1.1) (-1.5) (-1.2) (-1.4)
Shutdownt−1 -17.379* -0.938* -0.593* -0.093*
(-6.7) (-6.8) (-6.7) (-3.3)
t-statistics in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
15For readability, we report only the estimates of the coefficients of the two variables of interest.
The full set of results corresponding to Table 1, as well as to Tables 2 and 3, is available from the
authors upon request.
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Within-group inequality
To identify the effects of establishment turnover on within-group
inequality, we re-estimated equation 1 using as dependent variables the
same measures of wage inequality used to produce the results in Table
1, now computed within each gender, age, and education sub-group
considered.
The results we obtained - Table 2 - still indicate that the turnover
of establishments influences wage inequality (i.e., within-group inequal-
ity), through the exit margin. With the exception of the group of college
graduates, for whom no significant effect was obtained, the greater the
share of job destruction accounted for by the demise of existing estab-
lishments, the smaller wage inequality is within all demographic and
education groups considered. The effect is also greater at the top than
at the bottom of the wage distribution. As before, startups have no
significant effect on within-group inequality, the only exceptions being
the groups of the most highly-educated workers (12 years of education
or with a college degree). For these two groups, establishment star-
tups decrease within-group wage inequality, but only at the top of the
distribution.
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TABLE 2: WAGE INEQUALITY WITHIN GROUPS - Region FE estimates (N=450)
CV P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10
Gender groups
Men
Startupt−1 -2.66 -0.328 -0.153 -0.066***
(-0.9) (-1.6) (-1.3) (-1.7)
Shutdownt−1 -11.747* -1.059* -0.564* -0.139*
(-5.1) (-6.5) (-5.9) (-4.6)
Women
Startupt−1 -6.257 -0.162 -0.084 -0.035
(-1.3) (-1.2) (-0.9) (-0.9)
Shutdownt−1 -26.956* -0.580* -0.475* 0.032
(-7.2) (-5.6) (-6.6) (1.0)
Age groups
<25
Startupt−1 -2.614 -0.066 0.008 -0.05
(-0.6) (-0.7) (0.1) (-1.2)
Shutdownt−1 -27.123* -0.192* -0.209* 0.055***
(-7.1) (-2.7) (-4.6) (1.7)
25-34
Startupt−1 -5.672 -0.191 -0.116 -0.025
(-1.4) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-0.7)
Shutdownt−1 -21.127* -0.669* -0.321* -0.123*
(-6.6) (-5.4) (-4.6) (-4.3)
35-54
Startupt−1 -1.393 -0.121 -0.014 -0.038
(-0.5) (-0.5) (-0.1) (-0.7)
Shutdownt−1 -11.402* -1.395* -0.657* -0.243*
(-4.8) (-7.2) (-5.9) (-5.9)
>54
Startupt−1 -1.803 -0.122 -0.054 -0.027
(-0.5) (-0.6) (-0.4) (-0.7)
Shutdownt−1 -12.303* -0.442* -0.307* -0.008
(-4.5) (-2.8) (-3.1) (-0.3)
Education groups
<9 years
Startupt−1 -3.27 -0.107 -0.055 -0.026
(-1.1) (-1.0) (-0.9) (-0.8)
Shutdownt−1 -13.369* -0.411* -0.288* -0.023
(-5.6) (-4.9) (-5.7) (-0.9)
9 years
Startupt−1 -1.79 0.131 -0.051 0.132***
(-0.6) (0.5) (-0.3) (1.7)
Shutdownt−1 -11.145* -1.891* -0.853* -0.321*
(-4.7) (-8.2) (-6.0) (-5.0)
12 years
Startupt−1 -5.610** -0.138 -0.235** 0.111
(-2.0) (-0.7) (-2.2) (1.6)
Shutdownt−1 -5.181** -1.136* -0.336* -0.303*
(-2.3) (-6.9) (-4.0) (-5.4)
College
Startupt−1 -10.465* -0.689 -0.454* 0.146
(-2.8) (-1.4) (-2.6) (0.7)
Shutdownt−1 2.662 0.356 0.129 0.097
(0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.6)
t-statistics in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Between-group inequality
Consider now the effect of establishment turnover on wage inequality
between different sub-groups defined along the demographic variables
considered before. In Table 3 we report the estimates of the coefficients
of variables Startup and Shutdown in equation 1 that are obtained us-
ing the OLS estimates of the coefficients of the corresponding gender,
age, and education groups as dependent variables in that same equa-
tion.16 The results indicate that more jobs being created by newly-
born establishments cause more wage inequality between workers aged
25− 34 and the omitted category (below 25 years of age) and between
all groups of educational attainment and the reference group (less than
9 years of schooling).
16The procedure used to obtain such estimates is described in Section 2. We used the one-year
lag of variables Startup and Shutdown
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TABLE 3: WAGE INEQUALITY BETWEEN SUB-GROUPS
Region FE estimates (N=450)
Between gender sub-groups
(omitted: Men)
Women
Startupt−1 0.007
(0.4)
Shutdownt−1 0.057*
(4.1)
Between age sub-groups
(omitted: <25 years)
25-34 35-54 >54
Startupt−1 0.035* 0.018 -0.004
(2.6) (1.2) (-0.2)
Shutdownt−1 -0.018*** -0.031** 0.001
(-1.7) (-2.5) (0.1)
Between education sub-groups
(omitted: <9 years)
9 years 12 years College
Startupt−1 0.106* 0.085* 0.186**
(3.9) (3.0) (2.4)
Shutdownt−1 0.004 0.041*** -0.169*
(0.2) (1.8) (-2.8)
t-statistics in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
To rationalize the results in Table 3, we should start by noting that
the composition of the workforce of establishments that start up, shut
down, and continue in activity are different, especially in terms of age
and schooling achievement (Table 4). As expected in a country where
average schooling achievement is low but increasing very rapidly, star-
tups employ younger and more educated workers. The share of workers
below the age of 25 is, for these establishments, 18.8 percent, and 24.3
percent of all their workers have completed at least 12 years of school-
ing (the corresponding figures for pre-existing establishments are 14.1
percent and 21.2 percent, respectively). The composition of the work-
force of the establishments that shut down is also different from that of
surviving establishments, especially because they employ fewer college
graduates and more young people.
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TABLE 4: WORKFORCE COMPOSITION BY TYPE OF ESTABLISHMENT
Startups Shutdowns Continuing
Hourly wage (constant 1986 Euros) 1.222 1.227 1.285
Proportion of minimum wage earners 10.6% 9.0% 6.0%
Proportion of women 41.7% 41.5% 40.1%
Proportion of workers aged
< 25 years 18.8% 15.2% 14.1%
25− 34 years 33.5% 31.2% 30.7%
35− 54 years 38.5% 42.7% 44.1%
> 54 years 9.2% 10.9% 11.1%
Proportion of education groups
< 9 years of schooling 54.9% 59.1% 60.8%
9 years of schooling 17.5% 16.7% 16.2%
12 years of schooling 16.7% 14.9% 14.1%
College graduates 7.6% 6.7% 7.1%
Non-defined 3.3% 2.7% 1.8%
Compositional effects alone could explain the estimated effect of
startups on between-group wage inequality, but not those of shutdowns.
A clearer understanding of the link between establishment turnover and
between-group wage inequality can be obtained if we consider how es-
tablishments in different stages of their life-cycle - i.e., startups, shut-
downs and continuing - reward their workforce according to the char-
acteristics we examine. To do that, we estimated standard Mincerian
wage equations on pooled worker-level data spanning the entire period
under study. These equations were estimated separately on data for
workers (i) employed in establishments that were either newly-created
or continuing in each year, and (ii) employed in establishments that
either exited the market or survived in activity in each year. The set of
regressors include controls for gender, age and schooling. Also included
was an indicator of being employed in a startup/shutdown establish-
ment (equal to one if that is the case) as opposed to a continuing-
surviving establishment, plus all cross-products of the dummy variable
and each one of the other regressors in these equations. The estimates
of the coefficients of the multiplicative terms are direct evidence on
the relative magnitude of the wage premia paid for each of the worker
characteristics by startups/shutdowns and continuing-surviving units.
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No causal interpretation of these results is intended.
Results in Table 5 show that pay policies, as summarized by the
prices paid for each characteristic of the labor input, vary across the
three types of establishments. As compared to continuing establish-
ments, startups pay higher wages to workers aged 25 to 34 relative to
workers below the age of 25 (+0.3 percent) and to women relative to
men (the gender wage gap is smaller by 1.9 percent). However, the
same establishments pay lower wages to workers above the age of 35
relative to workers below the age of 25 and to all groups of schooling
achievement relative to workers with less than 9 years of schooling (the
differential between the returns paid by new and continuously operat-
ing units are −4.6 percent, −5.1 percent, and −3.7 percent for 9 years,
12 years, and college education, respectively). We should note, how-
ever, that newly-created units also employ a considerably smaller share
of workers with less than 9 years of education (Table 4), which is the
current mandatory minimum level of schooling. Hence, even though
these units pay lower returns to education than the continuously oper-
ating units, returns to schooling increase with the share of job creation
accounted for by new establishments, because these units reduce the
relative demand for the least educated workers and this is the effect
that dominates.
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TABLE 5: OLS WORKER-LEVEL WAGE EQUATIONS
Dependent variable: log hourly wage
Startups Shutdowns
and and
Continuing Continuing
Gender (Female=1) -0.1504* -0.1503*
(-488.80) (-488.83)
Age
25-34 0.1041* 0.1042*
(394.84) (395.10)
35-54 0.1962* 0.1963*
(592.84) (593.37)
> 54 0.1691* 0.1692*
(306.50) (306.71)
Education
9 years 0.2303* 0.2304*
(574.91) (575.31)
12 years 0.3692* 0.3693*
(738.13) (738.09)
College 0.7741* 0.7742*
(820.94) (821.13)
Startup/Shutdown -0.0549* -0.0221*
(-26.79) (-9.41)
Incremental wage premia
for gender, age, and education
Gender 0.0193* -0.0002
(32.47) (-0.33)
Age
25-34 0.0031* -0.0088*
(4.12) (-9.96)
35-54 -0.0031* -0.0044*
(-3.74) (-4.75)
> 54 -0.0299* -0.0227*
(-21.89) (-16.00)
Education
9 years -0.0461* -0.0183*
(-61.02) (-21.73)
12 years -0.0509* -0.0158*
(-54.08) (-15.22)
College -0.0372* -0.0061*
(-18.72) (2.83)
Nr. Observations 26,183,581 25,901,463
R2 0.5405 0.5395
The regressor set also includes controls for skill categories and tenure.
t-statistics in parentheses.
*, **, *** denote significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
As compared to surviving units, establishments that shut down
pay lower unconditional and conditional wages and lower returns to
all worker observable characteristics (see also Carneiro and Portugal,
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2008, for a similar result). The combination of these two differences is
sufficient to explain why shutdowns reduce both within and between-
group inequality. Both types of inequality decrease because of different
employment composition (more low-paid workers) and different pay-
policies (low returns to all worker characteristics).
5 Conclusions
By framing the analysis of the importance of demand factors in terms
of the turnover of establishments we are able to describe how those
factors shape the evolution of wage inequality. Our findings show that
both startups and shutdowns of new and old establishments influence
the evolution of wage inequality, although in different ways.
Shutdowns reduce overall and within-group inequality because they
eliminate jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution in the aggregate
as well as within each group. Shutdowns also reduce inequality between
different sub-groups again because they eliminate more jobs in the bot-
tom sub-groups. It is by eliminating the lowest wages in the bottom
sub-group of each category that shutdowns raise the average wage in
that sub-group, thereby reducing the average premium paid to workers
in all other sub-groups, even if they eliminate the lowest wages in these
sub-groups as well.
Startups increase wage-inequality between age and, especially, ed-
ucation groups, because newly-created establishments make staffing
choices that are different from those made by continuously-operating
establishments and establishments that shut down, and biased towards
younger and more educated workers.
By facilating worker mobility, establishment turnover speeds up the
rate at which changes in the demand for different types of workers
translate into actual employment changes, thereby providing the means
through which demand and supply forces work their way into changing
19
the wage distribution. We note, however, that the more difficult it is
for continuing establishments to make changes to their workforce - the
higher are the adjustment costs - the more important will be the role of
establishment turnover as a source of change of the wage distribution.
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Appendix
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Startup 450 .511 .063 .296 .717
Shutdown 450 .438 .071 .241 .748
Share of women 450 .390 .062 .179 .492
Share of youth 450 .184 .059 .088 .394
Share of college graduates 450 .040 .029 .003 .178
Annual employment growth (net) 450 .027 .036 -.107 .200
Year of expansion 450 .467 .499 0 1
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Figure 1: Overall inequality - Coefficient of Variation.
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Figure 2: Overall inequality - Ratios between percentiles 90, 50, and 10.
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Figure 3: Inequality within gender groups - Coefficient of Variation.
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Figure 4: Inequality between gender groups - Estimates of the coefficient
of the gender variable in wage equations.
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Figure 5: Inequality within age groups - Coefficient of Variation.
27
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
year
age 25−34 age 35−54
age>54
Figure 6: Inequality between age groups - Estimates of the coefficient of
age groups in wage equations.
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Figure 7: Inequality within education groups - Coefficient of Variation.
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Figure 8: Inequality between education groups - Estimates of the coeffi-
cient of education groups in wage equations.
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